Perspectives
Keep
Reading

GW&K Investment Review 1Q 2025
Macro | InsightGW&K Quarterly Investment Review featuring Founder-Chairman and Chief Investment Officer Harold G. Kotler's economic commentary.
Read Article
Consumer Spending Faces Crosswinds After Strong 2024
Macro, Domestic Equity | InsightWill consumers stay resilient or pullback? Our Global Strategist Bill Sterling shares his research on spending trends and what they mean for investors.
Read Article
GW&K Investment Management Appoints New Partners
Macro | Press ReleaseLeigh Williamson and Gayle Hodus named partners of the firm.
Read ArticleThis Website Uses Cookies
We use cookies to improve your experience on our website. To accept cookies click Accept & Close, or continue browsing as normal. For more information or to learn how to opt out of cookies, please see our cookie policy.
Accept and CloseStay Updated & Informed with GW&K
GW&K's CIO and Portfolio Managers share their insights and opinions on the economy and market each quarter.
-
Latest Insight
GW&K Investment Review 1Q 2025
Macro
GW&K Quarterly Investment Review featuring Founder-Chairman and Chief Investment Officer Harold G. Kotler's economic commentary.
-
Latest Market Commentary
State Of The States 2025 — Poised For Fiscal Stability
Municipal Bond
Fiscal conditions across state governments remain healthy as the sector heads into 2025.
Read Article
“Liberation Day” Tariffs: An Unprecedented Break With Free Trade
GW&K Insights | April 2025
The April 2nd “Liberation Day” tariff announcements represent what The Economist has called “America’s total abandonment of the world trading order and embrace of protectionism” and “the most profound, harmful, and unnecessary economic error of the modern era.” Financial markets recognized the risk posed by disruptive US policies earlier this year but were nonetheless shocked by both the scale and chaotic implementation of these measures, including that the rates were determined based on a spurious formula that does not in fact correspond to tariff rates charged against us by these countries. The S&P 500’s immediate 13% plunge over the following four trading days reflects the market’s grave assessment of this policy shift.
The April 2nd tariff package included:
• “Reciprocal” tariffs targeting virtually all US trading partners
• Differentiated rates: 34% on China, 27% on India, 24% on Japan, and 20% on the European Union
• A minimum 10% tariff on all target nations, with even higher punitive rates for certain smaller economies
When combined with existing trade barriers, China initially faced a staggering 65% effective tariff rate. Canada and Mexico were temporarily spared, and the new measures won’t compound existing industry-specific tariffs (such as the 25% levy on automobiles), America’s overall tariff rate was projected to rise to 24%—exceeding even the notorious Smoot-Hawley tariffs of the Great Depression era. But subsequent measures by President Trump have pushed tariffs on China to 104% on most goods, which will raise America’s overall tariff rate to 28% (Figure 1).
ECONOMIC IMPACT: THE ARITHMETIC OF AN IMPENDING DOWNTURN
For all their complexity, the economic consequences of these tariffs follow a straightforward calculation. US goods imports constitute approximately 11% of GDP, and the average effective tariff rate has jumped by roughly 26 percentage points. With most of these increased costs expected to pass through to consumers, the drain on spending power could surpass 2.5% of GDP—effectively one of the largest tax increases in American history, exceeding anything since the Revenue Act of 1968 that preceded the 1969-70 recession (Figure 2).
To put this in perspective:
A typical US recession involves a GDP contraction of about 2 percentage points from peak to trough.
INFLATION COMPLICATIONS: A NEW DILEMMA FOR THE FEDERAL RESERVE
Beyond threatening growth, these tariffs create a significant inflation challenge. Higher import prices could push inflation toward 4% in coming quarters, severely complicating the Federal Reserve’s efforts to achieve its 2% target. This has created a policy dilemma for Chair Jerome Powell, who indicated last Friday that the Fed remains hesitant to cut rates until it better understands the tariffs’ impact.
Powell emphasized the Fed’s commitment to preventing temporary tariff-induced price increases from becoming persistent inflation—a stance that suggests rate cuts may require clear evidence of economic deterioration first. This cautious approach could inadvertently increase recession risks as the economy absorbs the tariff shock.
MARKET EXPECTATIONS AND RECESSION PROBABILITIES
The probability of a recession has surged across multiple measurements:
These recession concerns align with deteriorating survey data, as both consumer and business sentiment weakened considerably in early 2025 on tariff anxieties. Key indicators include surveys from the Conference Board, University of Michigan, and the CEO Confidence Index, all of which are likely to decline further as concerns intensify about rising prices, falling profits, reduced investment, and potential job losses.
LABOR MARKET VULNERABILITIES AND SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTIONS
The labor market enters this challenging period from a position of relative strength, having added an average of 152,000 jobs monthly in Q1 amid historically low layoffs. However, with tariffs scheduled to take effect on April 9th, the second and third quarters will likely bear the brunt of the negative impacts.
Of particular concern is the potential for rapid supply chain disruption. As international vendor relationships suddenly become unprofitable, companies will be forced into hasty adjustments, contract cancellations, and potentially significant layoffs. These supply chain fractures could amplify the already substantial economic drag from reduced consumer spending power.
Meanwhile, financial markets are positioning for a more aggressive monetary policy response, with 2-year Treasury yields falling 10 basis points this month to 3.76%. Fed funds futures now price in at least four rate cuts this year—a sharp increase from the fewer than two cuts expected in mid-February (Figure 4). However, these would likely be “bad cuts” responding to economic weakness rather than “good cuts” driven by naturally moderating inflation.
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY AND GLOBAL RETALIATION
The final critical variable is whether the President will modify his stance given the severe market reaction. While he has suggested openness to reducing tariffs if other nations offer “phenomenal” concessions, other reports indicate he intends to stay the course, believing tariffs will ultimately repatriate jobs to America.
Regardless of potential policy adjustments, substantial damage has already been inflicted on confidence in both the US economy and the global trading system. China’s swift retaliation measures with 84% tariffs on US exports likely presages similar responses from other trading partners, potentially extending beyond goods to services exports as well.
OUTLOOK: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES EVEN IF POLICIES MODERATE
Even the partial and modest tariff reversals that many economists anticipate will leave investors confronting a fundamentally altered global trade landscape. The enduring negative effects on global growth and inflation prospects appear inevitable, challenging policy makers, businesses, and investors to navigate an economic environment that has been made significantly more uncertain by this abrupt policy shift.
As the international trade architecture built over decades undergoes this stress test, market participants must prepare for prolonged volatility and potentially significant structural changes to global supply chains, inflation dynamics, and growth trajectories in the quarters and years ahead.
William P. Sterling, Ph.D.
Global Strategist
William Sterling, Ph.D.
Global StrategistDisclosures
This represents the views and opinions of GW&K Investment Management and does not constitute investment advice, nor should it be considered predictive of any future market performance. Data is from what we believe to be reliable sources, but it cannot be guaranteed. Opinions expressed are subject to change. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
Indexes are not subject to fees and expenses typically associated with managed accounts or investment funds. Investments cannot be made directly in an index. Index data has been obtained from third-party data providers that GW&K believes to be reliable, but GW&K does not guarantee its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Third-party data providers make no warranties or representations relating to the accuracy, completeness or timeliness of the data they provide and are not liable for any damages relating to this data. The third-party data may not be further redistributed or used without the relevant third-party’s consent. Sources for index data include: Bloomberg, FactSet, ICE, FTSE Russell, MSCI and Standard & Poor’s.